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Abstract
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) plays a central role for the Fourth Industrial Rev-
olution. In the scope of Industry 4.0 many specialists of the field are working together
towards implementing large scalable, reliable and secure Industrial environments. How-
ever, existing environments are lacking security standards and have limited resources per
component which results in various security breaches such as trust in between the com-
ponents, partner factories or remote control units with the system. Due to the resilience
and it’s security properties, combining blochchain-based solutions with IIoT environments
is gaining popularity. Despite that, chain-structured classic blockchain solutions are ex-
tremely resource-intensive and are not suitable for power-constrained IoT devices. To
mitigate the security challenges presented above a secure architecture is proposed by us-
ing a DAG-structured asynchronous blockchain which can provide system security and
transactions efficiency at the same time. Use-cases and sequence diagrams were created to
model the solution and a security threat analysis of the architecture is made. Threat anal-
ysis is performed based on STRIDE methodology and provides us in depth understanding
how our security architecture mitigates the threats and reveals also open challenges. The
results are robust, supported by extensive security evaluation, which foster future devel-
opment over the proposed architecture. Therefore, the contributions made are valid, and
as the architecture is generic, will be possible to deploy it in diverse custom industrial en-
vironments. The flexibility of the architecture will allow incorporation of future hardware
and software development in the field.
Keywords: IIoT, Industry 4.0, Trust, Blockchain, Cybersecurity
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Resumo
A Internet das Coisas Industriais (IIoT) tem um papel central na quarta revolução indus-
trial. Na Indústria 4.0 muitos especialistas colaboram com o objetivo de criar ambientes
industriais escaláveis, confiáveis e seguros. No entanto, os cenários existentes carecem
de normas de segurança, os recursos dos componentes são limitados, que levam a várias
falhas de segurança que impedem a confiança entre dos diversos componentes, entre fábri-
cas parceiras e entre unidades de controlo remoto de sistemas. Soluções suportadas por
blockchain em ambientes IIoT estão a ganhar popularidade, principalmente devido à sua
resiliência e propriedades de segurança. Contudo, as soluções baseadas em blockchain
clássicas estruturadas em cadeia fazem uso intensivo dos recursos, o que as torna não
adequadas pra dispositivos IoT com restrição de energia. Para mitigar os desafios apre-
sentados, propõe-se uma arquitetura segura que recorre a uma blockchain assíncrona com
uma estrutura DAG, que procura fornecer segurança e eficiência nas transações. Casos de
uso e diagramas sequência foram criados para modelar a solução e é realizada uma análise
de ameaças de segurança à arquitetura. A análise recorre à metodologia STRIDE e fornece
informação de como a nossa proposta mitiga as ameaças e revela também os desafios em
aberto. Os resultados da avaliação demonstram que esta abordagem é robusta permitindo
o desenvolvimento futuro da arquitetura proposta. As contribuições deste trabalho são
validas, e como a arquitetura é genérica, será possível a sua implantação em diversas
ambientes indústrias específicos. A flexibilidade da arquitetura permitirá incorporar os
futuros desenvolvimentos na área sejam hardware e/ou software.
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This chapter presents the scope of the thesis, the main goals, research methodology and
the structure of the document.
1.1 Scope
Internet of Things (IoT) topic is one of the most discussed topics in the business and
technology for the last few years. Things in IoT are not general-purpose devices such as
computers or tablets. They are dedicated-function objects such as connected cars, smart
watches, automated industrial system components, etc. Number of connected devices is
growing every day and it’s predicted that there will be around 20 billion connected devices
in the world by 2020 [1].
Internet of things integrates heterogeneous devices and give opportunities for device
interaction without human intervention. Devices which are part of IoT network are called
nodes and are operating autonomously. IoT nodes can be considered as various sensors,
devices and other objects which have connection to the internet and are capable of ex-
changing data with other nodes with minimal human intervention. One of the important
characteristics of the nodes is low processing power which does not allow usage of heavy
network protocols for data exchange. Internet of things is now used in many areas, such as
automated smart home systems, healthcare, manufacturing environments, etc. All listed
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are areas where private information is being exchanged and processed. Vulnerabilities in
IoT environments can become a cause of various issues in information security perspective
as well as in real world scenarios by damaging devices or people physically.
Main security challenges in IoT world are authentication, authorization, access control,
data privacy and trust. Based on the IoT model there are three main vectors which we
need to take into account as potential cause of threats: application, transportation and
perception. This means that security need to be implemented on all layers in order to
prevent any possible attacks. At the same time lightweight and flexible solution is required
to support heterogeneity of the IoT devices with limited processing power [2].
With the continuous growth of the IoT field it’s being integrated in more and more
enterprise systems. Internet of Things is widely used in industrial control systems. With
all this new opportunities in automation and business areas we are facing with the systems
with higher level of complexity. Security can not be considered as an isolated part, but
rather as on of the aspects of system architecture [3].
1.2 Goals
The main goal of this thesis is to propose a solution for secure data exchange in IIoT
and make its threat modelling. To fulfill this main goal, several intermediate goals where
defined, as follows:
• Understand the Industry 4.0 environment
• Study the IIoT common protocols and architecture
• Review the security of Industrial Control Systems
• Analyse the applicability of blockchain for IoT
• Research how to apply threat modelling methodologies
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1.3 Research Methodology
The main goal of the research was to explore the current state of the art of the security in
IIoT environment, identify potential threats and current capability of devices enrolled in
the industrial environments. Further research have been done on the currently existing so-
lutions in the mentioned area in order to study problems that researchers in this area have
faced. The methodology chosen for bibliographic analysis is a combination of quantitative
and qualitative approach covering articles and surveys from the past 5 years. Several sur-
veys have been analyzed to collect the full picture of the state of security in the industrial
internet of things environment and to identify changes in technologies/communication
methods used.
1.4 Document Structure
Chapter 2 provides details about in depth research performed in order to understand
threats and challenges in IIoT environment. Generic architecture model and common
communication methods are described showing all main components in the environment.
Is also analysed, with a closer look to security aspects, the usage of the blockchain tech-
nology to improve the security on the system.
In Chapter 3 proposes an architecture of the solution that can solve the security issues
identified in the research process in IIoT environments.
In Chapter 4 makes a threat modelling of the proposed solution.






On this chapter, the state of the art on the area is reviewed, specially the scope of
the Industry 4.0 , common IIoT protocols and architecture and a brief presentation of
SCADA. Is also made an analysis to the security of industrial control systems and study
of blockchain use in IoT.
2.1 State of the Art
Number of companies approaching Industry 4.0 paradigm is growing on daily bases. Com-
panies are connecting their devices to the internet in order to increase productivity and
efficiency of the system. In this Internet-connected environments security issues are one
of the most challenging aspects to deal with. According to the management-consulting
firm, McKinsey & Company, automation of the industrial systems with IIoT will increase
efficiency by 15-20%. This automation will reduce downtime of the system and will give
benefits, such as remote control of the system, data exchange between system components
by network, etc.
Nowadays critical industrial environment is vulnerable to various attacks. According
to Cisco Annual Cybersecurity Reports, 31% of companies have experienced attacks on
Operational Technologies. Despite the fact that 75% of experts think of security as a high
priority component, only 16% are sure that the company is prepared to face cybersecurity
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issues. Main reason for that is the lack of standards for IIoT environments, endpoints
and communication protocols [4].
Industrial 4.0 is focused on digital transformation of industrial markets. 4.0 Industrial
revolution includes several segments such as logistics and supply chain, transportation,
mining, healthcare, oil and gas, etc. Transformations are implemented with use of IT and
OT, robotics, artificial intelligence, smart decentralized manufacturing infrastructures and
self-optimizing systems in information-driven, cyber-physical environment.
The term Cyber-Physical System (CPS) refers to any infrastructure connected to the
network that also interacts with the physical world. In the industrial world examples
of CPS systems are Industrial Control Systems (ICS). ICS is a general term to describe
large variety of management and control systems which are laying on the top of automated
systems and are used to control components of the infrastructure. ICS can ensure that
technical facilities run automatically by controlling business processes. These systems
are commonly used in the critical infrastructures which means that reliability, availability
and privacy are the main concerns for critical infrastructures. Core types of ICS are:
SCADA, Distributed Control System (DCS), Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), Re-
mote Terminal Unit (RTU), Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) and the interface which
is to ensure the communication of components [5].
As mentioned in IEC62443 specifications definition of IIoT system security is "Mea-
sures which are taken to protect the system or system state" [6]. This can be achieved by
establishing and maintaining the system in a way to prevent unauthorized access to the
system or its resources. This will also prevent data loss or major damage in the system.
ICS usually were isolated systems using proprietary control protocols. Nowadays as IT
solutions are being integrated into ICS environments, they are becoming open for remote
access and working on improving connectivity between system components. There are
many standards for IT environments security, but ICS can not use the same standards
and solutions for various reasons. Here are some of the specific requirements for ICS [5]:
• Functional requirements: As ICS are commonly used in production environments,
many components of the system are embedded, which eliminates the option of using
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some of the standard IT security solutions.
• Resources requirements: Many ICS are running on real-time operating systems
which is a highly resource consuming process. Also components of the ICS usually
have low processing power and machine specific limitations that exclude usage of
standard security solutions.
• Security requirements: Most of the scenarios in IT environment are simple and
related to loss of confidential information. On the other hand, the importance of
confidentiality and data privacy being an issue in industrial systems is also high-
lighted due to several circumstances, such as critical infrastructure and physical
world threats.
2.2 IIoT Common Protocols and Architecture
IIoT security survey shows that IIoT endpoints are the main source of vulnerabilities in
the system. IIoT endpoint definition depends on the architecture of the system. Term
endpoint can mean IoT device itself or group of devices responsible for any particular
operation or performing any role in the system. That means that talking about IIoT
endpoints we don’t necessarily mean amount of devices enrolled in the system. Endpoints
are managed through the network and are used for data exchange, data collection or
control purposes. Majority of the endpoints (around 72%) rely on Internet protocols use.
Second most used protocols (around 53%) are IP-based, domain specific protocols which
are replacing point-to-point, non-routable protocols for control systems. Table 2.1 shows
commonly used industrial protocols on different networking levels.
As discussed above, multiple protocols are used to organize communication in between
the endpoints. As machine-to-machine communication was evolving, there was a set of
protocols created, such as MQTT, COAP, XMPP, AMQP, etc. Most commonly used in-
dustrial protocols are Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) and Constrained
Application Protocol (COAP). These protocols are the most commonly used ones in the
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Table 2.1: Industrial protocols
Networking layer Protocol Scope
Application HTTP, COAP, MQTT, AMQP End to End
Transport UDP, TCP End to End
Network IP End to End
Routing RPL Per Hop
PAN 6LowPAN None
Data Link IEEE 802.15.4 Per Hop
industrial environment as they overcome others in terms of header size, power consump-
tion and data loss [2].
• Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT): This protocol is a messaging pro-
tocol based on publisher/subscriber mechanism. The publisher manages a list of
topics/events and subscriber can register to those topics to obtain information when
the event appears. This protocol is specifically developed for IoT devices with low
computing power. Security of the protocol is based on the TLS/SSL to provide en-
cryption on the transport layer. On the application layer it transfers client identifier
and credentials such as username/password that can be used for the device authen-
tication. As the TLS/SSL is not optimized to be used for power critical devices,
using it with certificates and session key management for multiple devices is a heavy
operation for devices with low capacity to handle. So this can be considered as a
disadvantage of this protocol that can be improved in the future.
• Constrained Application Protocol (COAP): This protocol is a modification of the
HTTP to make it more suitable for communication in between IoT devices. It is
an optimized REST protocol for sensor applications and it supports request/re-
sponse and resource/observer architecture. COAP is a UDP protocol. Security is
normally achieved by using Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) or IPSec.
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) is adding confidentiality, integrity and
authentication.
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Figure 2.1: SCADA network architecture
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ICS architecture consists of 2 layers: physical layer and cyber-layer. Phisical layer in-
cludes all sensors and hardware components which are forming the network. Cyber-layer
is composed mainly from SCADA systems. Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems are a set of protocols, platforms and technologies used to manage Indus-
trial Control Systems (ICS). Protection of SCADA systems have been based on physical
isolation. Due to this concept this kind of systems have been managed in an isolation
and with use of non-standard protocols. Nowadays SCADA systems started to connect
to enterprise networks and accordingly use standard protocols for communications, which
caused various security issues for the environment [7].




Control network can be composed of a mesh of PLCs, RTUs and Wireless Sensor and Ac-
tuator Networks (WSANs). RTUs are responsible for connecting to physical systems and
collecting data. PLCs receive data from physical layer and sending control commands to
actuators. Also, PLCs are executing commands which they receive and are sending data
received from physical layer to SCADA servers. WSANs came to replace old data gath-
ering approach by the network of wireless embedded sensors. This requires development
of an interface between the physical layer and it’s digital part [7].
Each component of SCADA systems has its own security issues and specific vulnera-
bilities which will be discussed in the following subsections.
2.2.1 Communication Infrastructure
Components responsible for communication between other services are a direct target
for attacks. Most common attacks are meant to cause Denial of Service (DOS). This
issue can be solved by using secure network protocols which are covering authentication,
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confidentiality and integrity aspects. But in industrial automation it’s hard to find any
protocols that implement these specifications. Usually the main priority in this field is
meeting real-time requirements [8].
Use of secure protocols and intermediate pre-checks leads to performance issues and
communication delays in time-critical infrastructures, but existing vulnerabilities are mak-
ing necessary to find balance between latency and security. Communication components
also interact with external networks, that’s why it’s important to protect not only the
data transferred but also access to communication functionality.
Network interconnection points such as wireless access points, storage, corporate
servers are also intrusion points and need to be monitored by Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems (IDSs). For sharing information in external and internal networks additional routers
and firewalls are being deployed by IDSs which are capable of identity checks and traffic
analysis. Similar solutions are used to protect gateways [9].
2.2.2 Application Server
There are three basic functions which server is capable of: receive request, process it and
return a response. Attacks basically will try to take advantage of at least one of this
processes. Risk can be minimized by role based access control. Also input validation and
coding polices can be risk reducing factors. Validation checks will include message format
and parameters checks such as XML or JSON schema validations, harmful characters
checks to prevent injection attacks and unexpected message order checks [10].
DOS attacks are targeting server load which will not be able to process more traffic
than its available bandwidth [11]. In SCADA systems the task to detect anomalies in the
node behaviour is easier that in other cases, because nodes are usually known components
of the system with predictable behavioral patterns.
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2.2.3 Database Server
Database server is the location where all data is stored and basically it is the main source
for monitoring processes. Attack at this level can damage the system overall. Database
server need to have implemented security measures providing integrity and confidentiality
to stored information. Confidentiality measure can be data encryption, while integrity
can be guaranteed by using redundant sources of information [12].
2.2.4 Human Machine Interface
Human Machine Interface (HMI) usually is a high priority control process within SCADA
system, which means that commands sent from HMI will be executed by other components
almost blindly. For securing HMI will be necessary to secure every actuator over its
software. Vulnerability cause can be software drivers which are integration mechanisms.
They enable communication between processes such as files, signals, sockets, messages,
etc. Also HMI is running on a machine which is controlled by operating system (OS).
OS vulnerabilities are also additional threat to the component security overall. Being in
the position of middleware for running processes, OS is capable of setting access control
policies and blocking unauthorized system calls by the given processes [13].
2.2.5 Program Logic Controller
PLC consists of following parts: OS, ladder logic (program), runtime system, which com-
municates with ladder logic by passing inputs to it and registering outputs, fieldbus com-
munication and management services, which are usually enabling remote management
services controlled by HMI .
In case of PLCs file system is one of the potential threats. PLC components are
constantly reading from configuration files and registering some information in the log
files. By accessing those files used by the runtime system, attacker will be able to take
advantage over all system [14].
Communication needs particular protection, as it is commonly used to connect to
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Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) or other servers. Also one important component that needs
attention is acting as a middleware or driver in communication infrastructures. Common
issue is that some PLCs are running on a monolithic OS which does not have user access
lists built in. One of the security measures is to implement that feature for the operation
system.
2.2.6 Remote Terminal Unit
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) is also known as Electronic Intelligent Device(EID) [4].
They are serving as sensors and actuators, but they can be used as decision making
nodes as well. RTUs can be included in a sub-network of cooperation units. Attacks
compromising RTUs can degrade the performance of overall system by performing DOS
attacks to underlying services. Latest RTUs possessing more computing power can be
capable of several security measures based on individual or distributed hierarchy.
2.3 State of Art of Industrial Control Systems Secu-
rity
During the evolution of industrial control systems security have been improved. Wake-up
call for that where several attacks performed on a critical industrial infrastructures which
lead to loss of money and mechanical distractions. Below we will describe several aspects
of security and will point out state of art in the currently functioning environments.
Unauthorized access and malware The Stuxnet worm attack in 2010 was an alarm
for industrial systems security all around the world. It’s main target was modifying code
on Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) in order to change their behaviour. Also a
lot of effort was made to hide the changes from the creators by generating legitimate
data. One of the lessons learned due to this attack was that "Do not touch a production
system" concept does not relate to the case of critical industrial systems. As some of the
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vulnerabilities were identified as 2 years old, updates should be applied to the system
continuously [15].
US department of Energy published list of requirements for improving SCADA network
security. One of the requirements is applying patches on old SCADA systems and having
strong control over potential SCADA network backdoors [16].
Also as historically industrial network was isolated, communication protocols did not
include access control policies.
Lack of risk assessment system Attacks in the last 10 years of ICS appeared in
various sectors of the industry. As security methods researches just began in recent years,
security measures and safety indicators are vague. Also as ICS environments are multilayer
environments and attacks are long duration and large-scale, well known security measures
are not applicable here or are performing partial coverage of the infrastructure and leaving
many backdoors. In addition, because of less data and low objectivity factors, it’s hard
to build quantitative models of ICS safety assessment.
Lack of security testing technology There is a huge difference between traditional
IT systems and ICS systems security and performance metrics. Intrusion detection mech-
anisms used for IT systems are not suitable for ICS. For ICS intrusion detection is per-
formed by collection and analysis of network behavior. It detects if there is any invasion
against ICS systems by comparing with known intrusion model or analyzing based on
unknown model [5].
Lack of behavior audit The relatively isolated environment in ICS lets internal com-
ponents easily access any other components and make mistakes or destructive actions in
the application level. Therefore, it is necessary to do monitoring and auditing for pro-
duction network access and it’s behavior, periodically check for system data integrity and
analyze control protocols authentication mechanisms. Usually the main omissions are
appearing in log analysis auditing and configuration files modification checks. Existing
security products can not be directly used for ICS systems, because they are not capable
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of industrial communication protocols in use. Lack of the standards for industrial com-
munication protocols is making development of security solutions for ICS very custom,
costy and mosty inefficient. This is one of the reasons for the absence of behavior audit
of illegal operations in ICS systems [17].
2.4 SCADA Network Topology
SCADA is a system that collects data from various sensors, machines and factory units
in local or remote locations and controls them over SCADA network. Some devices/com-
ponents of SCADA system will be listed below [18]:
1. MTU(Master Terminal Unit)
MTU is the root node of the system which is capable of controlling RTUs. SCADA
system is normally designed in a hierarchical structure and includes a central MTU
communicating with sub-MTUs and RTUs. MTUs and sub-MTUs have computing
power similar to a desktop computer.
2. RTU (Remote Terminal Unit)
RTUs are devices composed of sensors which are able to communicate by network,
receive and execute commands from MTU and sub-MTUs. These devices usually
have limitations in the processing power and memory. Commonly in architecture of
SCADA systems RTUs are located remotely from control center, which makes them
more insecure.
3. HMI (Human Machine Interface)
HMI is the interface into a system for the operator or the admin of the system. It
usually supports a graphic interface. This component of the system was designed
to utilize all remaining client connection options which will reduce amount of the
backdoors to the system which need to be protected.
Network topology of SCADA systems is usually static, which means communication
15
paths between components or groups of components are predefined. Here are some basic
communication paths between the components discussed above:
1. MTU-RTU communication:
This is a one to many communication, which means that one MTU can communicate
with many RTUs by sending data requests. The type of the communication can be
described as master slave, where MTU is the master and RTUs are the slaves.
Communication can be implemented in many ways, such as internet, radio, physical
cable, etc.
2. RTU-RTU communication:
In the hierarchy of components RTUs are standing on the same level, which gives
them opportunity to communicate directly. In number of scenarios such communi-
cation is even required. Any security solution implemented for RTUs should support
this communication.
3. HMI-MTU communication:
This communication is based on TCP/IP protocols and has a client-server archi-
tecture. Having this communication in place requires considering possible external
attack models. This means system need to have well defined access control mecha-
nism to prevent the attacks.
2.5 Blockchain in IoT
Blockchain based systems are classical distributed systems where all participants are Geo-
distributed and connected via different networks. Blockchain can be classified by two
main types: permissionless and permissioned. Permissionless systems are publicly open
for use which results in any node being able to perform a transaction or participate in
the consensus process. Permissioned platforms are designed in a close-ended manner
which means that the system has well defined and fixed set of nodes participating in the
consensus process [19].
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During last few years, with the development of blockchain technology and it’s varia-
tions for specific fields, the idea of using it in IoT environment has gained interest. With
having features of decentralized consensus system in blockchain, it’s integration with IIoT
environments can be a good solution for security issues. Most of the existing solutions
are adopting chain-structured blockchain in IoT systems. As blockchain solutions need to
meet real-world requirements in IoT field, such as low latency and high performance, lim-
itations in consensus models need to be discussed. Three main challenges of integrating
IoT with blockchain are:
1. The trade-off between efficiency and security:
Consensus algorithms in blockchain can provide high level security by preventing
malicious attacks in the system. Proof-of-Work(PoW) is the most used consensus
algorithm. In PoW algorithm, nodes need to prove that they are spending significant
amount of energy to run complex hash algorithms for transactions verification. This
is the reason why PoW mechanisms are not suitable for IoT devices with limited
power resources. Apparently, eliminating PoW is a potential cause of security issues,
so the goal is to find a balanced solution.
2. The coexistence of transparency and privacy:
Blockchain is designed to provide transparency in between peers, which is an im-
portant characteristic in finance field. As some critical IIoT environments require
confidentiality of sensitive data which need to be accessible only to authorized peers,
this characteristic of the blockchain can become a drawback. Consequently, design-
ing access control scheme for transparent systems is also important.
3. The conflicts between high concurrency and low throughput:
In IIoT environment data exchange is a continuous process, leading to a high con-
currency. On the other hand, complex security mechanisms, such as cryptography,
are limiting the throughput of the blockchain. In chain-structured blockchain model
besides the synchronous consensus model, the throughput of the blockchain is also
limited. So the issue here is to improve throughput of the blockchain in order to
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satisfy the bandwidth needs of IIoT environments for frequent transactions.
Based on the challenges described above, blockchain development is evolving into
different variations of classical idea. Based on the differences in the structure there are
two main types of the blockchain at the moment:
• Chain-Structured Blockchain
Existing implementations of blockchain are mainly based on chain-structured blockchain,
such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Hyperledger, etc. In the chain-structured blockchain sys-
tems the longest chain of blocks is considered as the main chain for the system. If
more then one blocks have been generated at the same time which are several mil-
liseconds apart from each other the first generated block will join the main chain
and for other blocks there will be created a fork. Only transaction placed in the
main chain will be considered as valid, which means all transactions in secondary
chains will be labeled as invalid blocks.
Figure 2.2: Chain-structured blockchain architecture diagram
However, chain-structured blockchain solutions are power-intensive and are not suit-
able for IIoT environments, where most of the components have low processing
power and all transactions are performed in a time critical environment. Also widely




In order to integrate blockchain with more critical environments such as IIoT, new
structure of blockchain have been created. The structure is based on idea of acyclic
graph architecture, which is called tangle.
Figure 2.3: DAG-structured blockchain diagram
In tangle, the concept of blocks is changed to an individual node representing each
transaction in the distributed ledger. Before each transaction will be submitted, it
must validate two previously attached but not verified transactions in the tangle,
which are called tips. Then the new transaction will be bundled with this two former
transactions by running the PoW algorithm. After bundling process is complete
the transaction is being broadcast to the main tangle network. Each transaction
always will be validated by newer transactions. Each transaction has a metric called
weight which is proportional to the number of validations for each transaction.
The weight is a metric similar to the concept of six-block-security in the chain-
structured blockchain. As bigger is the weight as harder is to alter it. First type
of the blockchain works with a synchronous consensus algorithm, which means that
transaction need to be validated before being attached to the main chain. Tangle
uses different approach in order to improve the throughput of the system which is
a critical metric in the IIoT environment. It adopts asynchronous consensus model
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and as shown in the Figure 2.3 the network is not limited to one main chain. It
forks all the time by forming a tangle net. There are several good implementations
of DAG-structured blockchain, such as IOTA, ByteBall and NANO [20].
2.6 Summary
Bibliography analysis provided a good understanding of security issues in the existing
industrial environments. Trust is one of the biggest gaps in sense of security for those
systems. As research showed standard security solutions are not suitable for Industrial
environments as components/devices participating in the industrial processes does not
have necessary capacity to be able to handle secure protocols or implement communication
using smart contracts. Any actions requiring computing power on the device side such
as encryption/decryption of the data are not relevant for the industrial environments
which will serve as a baseline for the requirements to the proposed architecture. Also,
devices can be the main cause of the vulnerabilities on the hardware level. This problem
can be solved only on the vendor side, but as the systems are very complex and most
of the devices are primitive sensors they don’t have a capability of continuous updates.
This is bringing up the next requirement for the proposed architecture to have a proper
authentication mechanism in place and be able to revoke malicious devices from the
system when required.
One of the discussed security solutions was a blockchain network. But as we know,
traditional block-structured blockchain requires usage of big amount of resources to be
able to participate in the network. As we mentioned earlier, devices in the industrial
environments have lack of processing power. For that reason DAG-structured blockchain
is being developed. Tangle network is commonly used for time and resource critical
environments and is implemented using DAG-structured blockchains. So for assuring





Considering the analysis previously made, on this chapter is presented a solution for
increasing security in IIoT environment by using blockchain technology. As a result of all
the research it’s proposed to implement a DAG-Structured blockchain security solution
on top of existing components in the IIoT architectures. Due to the specifications of
the Industrial environment, which are time and resource critical, this requirements have
been taken into consideration during the designing of the solution. The solution consists
of 2 main parts: access control and secure transaction chain generation to ensure trust
and data consistency in the system. As discussed in the previous chapter, nodes of the
industrial environment may have limited resources and can be divided into 2 types based
on their processing power capabilities: light nodes and full nodes. Light nodes are the
ones that does not have enough processing power to participate in the certain blockchain
actions such as Proof Of Work or consensus processes. So in our solution only full nodes,
such as gateways and managers, are considered members of a tangle network. Light nodes
are connecting to the full nodes to publish a transaction to the network. The full node
will sign each transaction received from a light node on their behalf, if the light node
doesn’t have this functionality, and will publish it to the tangle network by using the IRI
interface. IRI is implementation of IOTA which also provides HTTP REST interface, so
that light nodes can send transactions to the full nodes.
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3.1 Architecture
Figure 3.1: Architecture diagram of the proposed solution
On Figure 3.1 is depicted the architecture that will support the proposed solution.
The architecture is composed by diverse components, the main ones are wireless de-
vices, gateways, managers and the tangle network. Follows the description of each one:
• Wireless devices:
Wireless devices can be of the main 3 types: sensors, actuators, controllers. In
IIoT environment wireless devices are categorized as light nodes. Light node is a
term that is used to describe processing power of the device. These devices are
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called light nodes as they have limited resources and are not capable of using secure
protocols or performing any power-consuming actions. Each device needs to have
a unique identifier in the system and have to pass the authentication each and
every time when trying to perform a transaction. Term transaction will represent
any action such as sending a control command, data, request etc. As light nodes
does not have enough processing power to implement Proof of Work (POW) while
participating in the tangle network, we are not considering them being a direct part
of the network. Light nodes will be able to send transactions to the network through
the middleware. The role of the middleware for the light nodes authentication and
transaction transfer will serve the gateway. During the registration process each
device in the system it will be granted a public/private key pair which will be used
in future for signing transactions. Key pair generation will be performed by the
gateway. Registration process will be described in more details in the Manager
components.
• Gateways:
Gateways serve as a secure middleware in between light nodes and tangle network.
As gateways are considered as full nodes, they are responsible for tangle network
maintenance. A full node is a node in the tangle network that has all rights and
can participate in all processes in the network. Full nodes are storing copies of the
transaction chains in the network and also are allowed to publish transactions to
the tangle on behalf of the light nodes. Gateways also perform a role of a check-
point which only submits transactions from the light nodes that are authorized by
the manager. Gateways can be of 2 types: device gateway and external gateway.
Device gateway is responsible for key generation, authentication of group of devices
(light nodes) and organizing communication on their behalf. It also has capability to
translate commonly used protocols to HTTP to deliver message from device to the
http endpoint of the tangle network. External gateways are responsible for commu-
nication in between 2 factories. External gateways are the first access point for all
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the requests incoming to our industrial infrastructure from the outside. Gateways
are the core components of the architecture that need to be set up and configured
in order to be able to start devices registration and communication processes in the
system.
• Manager:
Manager is also a full node that is responsible for device management in the system.
Registration of the IoT device in the system is performed manually by the system
administrator. After the device enters the system it will be registered in the device
list by the manager. Device list is a list containing all registered and trusted devices
in that particular device group. Only manager has the right to add/delete authorized
sensors from the list which means that only the manager has a write permission for
the device list. Other full nodes of the system only have a read permission for the
device list. This access control rules are also designed to increase the security in the
system by preventing third party devices from making unauthorized changes. As
mentioned above, devices will be divided by device groups. There is a limitation to
have one manager node per device group. Manager is also a core component of the
architecture and it has to be predefined and set up before being able to start the
registration process for the light nodes.
• Tangle Network:
Tangle network in our architecture is a public blockchain network which allows any
parties to participate in the process. Tangle network is considered the central com-
ponent of the system as it serves as the main solution for the trust issue in the
system. Besides authentication mechanism discussed above, tangle network allow
us to have a consensus in the system for all published transactions. This is a re-
quirement in order to be able to perform transactions in between different industrial
environments or remote nodes of the system regardless of their geolocation and se-
curity implemented on each individual device. Tangle network structure allows to
protect system against several attacks, such as DDOS, double-spending, etc. It also
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improves throughput of time and resource critical environment in comparison to
chain-structured blockchain.
3.2 Functionalities
This section specify the use cases for the solutions and how the components interact with
each other to achieve those functionalities.
3.2.1 Registration of the device in the system
When a new device (Sensor, actuator, gateway, etc.) is being added to the existing IIoT
environment, it need to be registered in the tangle network device list. Device list is used
by various components and participates in processes such as authentication and data
exchange in the system.
Device registration is partially a manual process, which allow to have control over
added/removed devices instead of granting unlimited access control permissions to one of
the components and having it as the main vulnerable attack point. Three main compo-
nents participating in this process are administrator, device manager and device gateway.
Process of registration should be performed as follows and is shown on the diagram 3.3:
1. Admin user of the system inserts device credentials into the system, using an in-
terface located in the private network. If the device is capable to generate it’s own
public/private key pair, public key is added by admin during the registration process
2. Manager verifies that the device is not already registered in the device list. If the
device with provided credentials already exists in the device list, registration request
will be denied and error message will be returned to the requester.
3. Manager checks if the public key was provided in the registration process. If the
public key is provided it skips 5 steps below as shown on the 3.3 sequence diagram
and continues with registering the device to the device list step. If the public key is
not provided all the steps below should be executed.
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Figure 3.2: Use case diagram: device registration in the system
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Figure 3.3: Sequence diagram: device registration in the system
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4. Manager registers requested device in the device list.
5. Manager sends key generation request to the device gateway.
6. Gateway generates public/private key pair for the device.
7. Gateway saves generated key pair associated with the device UUID.
8. Gateway sends generated public key to the manager.
9. Manager registers device public key into the device list.
10. Manager is signing the device list with it’s public key.
11. Manager publishes latest version of the device list to the tangle network.
3.2.2 Revoking the device from the system
Admin user can request to revoke a specific device from the system. This can be due to
malicious software/hardware of the device or the component or simply due to the changes
in the IIoT environment’s architecture.
Device should be revoked from the system and all access control rules for it should be
reseted. For that matter is needed to revoke both the device from the device list, as it is
used for authentication during the communication of the devices and key pair generated
in the gateway. If the key is not generated in the gateway it skips the key revoking steps
and jump into device list revoking. As shown on the sequence diagram 3.5 for revoking
the device following actions should be performed:
1. Admin user inserts UUID of the device that need to be revoked from the device list.
2. Manager verifies that the following device exists in the device list. If it doesn’t exist
the request will fail and an error will be returned.
3. Manager sends revoke request to device gateway.
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Figure 3.4: Use case diagram: revoke the device
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Figure 3.5: Sequence diagram: revoke the device
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4. Gateway verifies that key pair for the requested device exists on the gateway. If
the key pair exists, gateway revokes keys of the device. If keys doesn’t exist on the
gateway a response will be sent to the manager.
5. Manager revoke the device from the device list.
6. Manager signs the device list.
7. Manager publishes the latest device list to the tangle network.
3.2.3 Disable/restore the device
There can be a case when is needed to disable the device temporarily for maintenance
reasons and prevent communication with it. For not doing any extra actions such as
revoking the keys and regenerating them later, it will just revoke the device from the
device list to prevent communication with it.
In this case only 2 main components will participate in the process as shown on the
use case diagram 3.6: admin and device manager.
As shown on the sequence diagram 3.7, following steps are performed in the disabling
process:
1. System admin sends request for disabling the device. The request should contain
UUID of the device.
2. Device manager verifies if the device exists in the device list. If it doesn’t exist
return a response with an error message. If it exists, the process follows for the next
step.
3. Manager revokes the device from the device list.
4. Manager signs the device list.
5. Manager published the latest device list to the tangle network.
31
Figure 3.6: Use case diagram: disable the device
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Figure 3.7: Sequence diagram: disable the device
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As shown on the use case diagram 3.8 during the restoring of the device restore request
will be sent to the manager to add the device to the device list. If the key pair was
generated on the device, the public-key should be provided in the restore request. If not
the manager will request the public key of the device from the gateway and will publish
the latest version of the device list to the tangle network. According to the sequence
Figure 3.8: Use Case diagram: restore the disabled device
diagram 3.9 the steps performed during the process will be as follows:
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1. System admin requests restoring the device by providing device UUID. If the key
pair for the device is generated on the device itself public key should be provided
in the request as well.
2. Manager validates if the device already exists in the device list. If it exists the
process will stop and an error message will be returned. If it doesn’t exist process
will continue with the next step.
3. If the public key is not provided in the request, request the public key from the
gateway.
4. The gateway validates that the requested device has a generated key pair.
5. Gateway returns the public key in the response.
6. Manager registers device UUID and public key in the device list.
7. Manager signs the device list.
8. Manager published the latest device list to the tangle network.
3.2.4 Communication in between 2 devices from different device
groups
Communication between the devices that belong to different device groups is organized
through the device group gateways. As shown on the use case diagram 3.10 there are 4
main components participating in this process: source and destination devices and their
gateways.
As mentioned earlier in the architecture diagram 3.1, communication will be performed
through the tangle network. The source device will generate the package that need to be
delivered to the destination. In the destination of the package both gateway and device
need to be specified. The package is sent by the source device to the device group gateway.
Normally, as sensors are using industrial protocols for communication, the package will
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Figure 3.9: Sequence diagram: restore the disabled device
be passed to the translation module of the gateway. This module will be described in
more details later in this chapter.
After being translated from industrial protocols to HTTP, gateway is submitting the
package as a transaction to the tangle network on behalf of the source device. After
the transaction is approved on the tangle network by other nodes, the destination device
group gateway will be notified about a new transaction in the network, as all the gateways
are full nodes on the tangle network. As soon as the gateway will get the notification
about the published transaction it will read it from the network, convert the package from
HTTP to industrial protocol appropriate for the destination device. After the translation,
the package will be sent to the destination device.
More detailed actions performed during the communication process are shown on the
sequence diagram 3.11 and are as follows:
1. Source device generates the package and sends it to the device group manager.
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Figure 3.10: Use case diagram: communication between 2 devices from different device
groups
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2. Device group gateway requests public key of the manager from the tangle network.
This public key can be cached on the device gateway and refreshed from time to
time to decrease the amount of actions performed during each transaction.
3. Gateway requests device list from the tangle network.
4. Gateway validates that the device list is signed by the manager. If not the process
stops and an error message is returned.
5. Gateway translates the package from industrial protocol used by source device to
HTTP.
6. Gateway signs the package and publishes a transaction to the tangle network on
behalf of the device.
7. Transaction is being approved on the tangle network and the destination gateway
receives a notification about a new transaction.
8. Destination gateway requests the public key of the source device group manager
from the tangle network.
9. Destination gateway requests device list of the source device group from the tangle
network.
10. Destination gateway validates that the device list was signed by source device group
manager.
11. Destination gateway validates that the sender of the package by using the device
list.
12. Destination gateway translates the package from HTTP to the appropriate protocol
of communication for the destination device.
13. Destination gateway sends the translated package to the destination device.
14. Destination device receives the package.
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Figure 3.11: Sequence diagram: communication between 2 devices from different device
groups
39
The sequence diagram 3.11 is showing the steps performed in the system to deliver
data from device A to B. Tangle network is shown as a separate node on the diagram but
in the actual implementation all gateways will be published to the tangle network as full
nodes, so the network will not be a standalone component of the system.
This architecture is flexible enough to allow us remove device group gateways from the
current position and organize direct communication between devices by using the tangle
network in the future when the devices will have required processing power to be able to
handle all the processes of the workflow described above.
As we know, there is a lack of standards for IoT devices and communication protocols
for them. Every vendor is free to use a protocol created by himself or choose one from
the most commonly used protocols depending on the environment requirements. This
brings to several issues in the industrial environments. One of those issues is organizing
communication in between devices that are using different protocols for communication.
To solve this issue we are suggesting to implement a module in our gateway that will be
responsible for protocol translation.
It’s recommended to use semantic gateways for solving interoperability issues. Transla-
tion can be organized for various network layers protocols, such as network, data link, etc.
On our solution the semantic gateway will be implemented to support only application
layer communication.
In the proposed architecture, gateway serves as a broker for IIoT devices to provide
them with the functionality of publishing transactions to the tangle network. As we dis-
cussed earlier, tangle network current implementation provides us an HTTP endpoint to
communicate with other nodes on the network. So semantic module of the gateway re-
sponsible for translation in between the protocols will contain the following functionality:
• Receive the package: receives and filters packages. It allows only the ones that
matches the format of one of the supported protocols. Gateway has an API for each
protocol where the packages are sent to by external devices.
• Analyze the package format: scans through all supported package structures and
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Figure 3.12: Components of the translation module in the semantic gateway
by comparing them to the received package extracts required fields.
• Convert the package: Converts the package from the identified format to HTTP or
from received HTTP back to the communication protocol of the destination device.
Converting procedure implies inserting the fields extracted in the previous step into
appropriate fields in the new package.
• Send the package to the destination: send the converted package to the destination.
Semantic gateway is used in various Industrial architectures and serves for transfor-
mations for different IIoT data formats. As shown on Figure 3.12, gateway will have
interfaces for each supported protocol. Those interfaces provide an opportunity to easily
extend the list of supported protocols on the gateway. Message broker on the mentioned
diagram is covering packages analyzing and converting functionality. Translation module
on the gateway provides an agnostic approach to the messaging protocols used in the
industrial environment and adds scalability to the system. In cases that the client sensor
is using HTTP for it’s communication the translation module will not be enrolled in the
future communication.
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3.3 Bootstrapping the system
The setup of the system is divided into 2 logical parts: core components and secondary
components. Core components should be set up and running before secondary components
will be connected to the system. Main difference is that core components set up and
configuration processes should be performed manually.
First we need to set up all device group gateways and device group managers to be
able to start performing registration and communication of secondary devices. As they
are the full nodes of the tangle network we should publish them to the tangle network
and both gateway and the manager of each device group should publish their public keys
to the tangle network. Full nodes will either generate key pair for themselves or the keys
will be uploaded on them during the system setup.
Components should be divided by device groups and each device group will have 2 full
nodes: device group manager and device group gateway. Device groups are defined based
on the architecture of the existing environments. The common scenario is separating
devices by device groups based on the network topology, which means that devices from
the same device group will either be a part of the same private network or will have
physical connections with each other.
The setup process of the components of our architecture is defined in the following
sections.
3.3.1 Setting Up the Tangle Network
Tangle network is the central component of the current solution. Technology used is called
IOTA. It’s a distributed ledger technology that allows to organize communication between
the nodes. The nodes are the core components of the network. They allow publishing
transactions that will be validated and attached to the tangle network.
For the current technology there are 2 main use cases: public network or private net-
work. Public network is used by the community mainly for the cryptocurrency exchange.
We are going to set up a private network.
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Private network allows us to isolate the network and keep it accessible only for the
nodes in our environment. Also, current architecture allows us to have a shared private
network in between multiple factories or industrial environments which will serve as a
communication method in between them.
All components will be set up and running on docker containers. For bootstrapping a
private tangle network, following components need to be set up and configured:
1. The Coordinator (COO): The coordinator is the component that creates, signs
and sends to all the nodes bundles of transactions from the same address with the
configured regular intervals. The bundles of the transactions contain the milestones
that are used by the nodes to reach a consensus. Here are the generic steps that
need to be performed in the bootstrapping process of the coordinator:
• Generate a valid random seed. Coordinator will use this seed to derive pub-
lic/private keys for signing bundles. Seed need to be backed up and stored
securely, as the loss of the seed will result in coordinator not being able to
generate milestones and overall system stopping.
• Configure the depth of the coordinator. Depth is an exponent that affects how
many private key/address pairs Compass has. It is a highly CPU intensive
process, so this parameter will be customized based on the machine resources
available.
• Run the calculator. This will generate and return the address of the coordina-
tor.
2. Running the IRI node: IRI is an open source implementation of IOTA protocol
on Java. To run the IRI node a custom snapshot file need to be created. Create the
snapshot.txt file and insert the address returned in the coordinator setup steps into
the first row of the file.
3. Start the IRI node: A command need to be executed to run the node. See more
details about the commands and docker images in the official how to guide [21]. IRI
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nodes have default configuration to use following 3 ports for communication:
• UDP neighbor peering port (default is 14600)
• TCP neighbor peering port (default is 15600)
• TCP HTTP API port (default is 14265)
Communication will mainly be organized by using the HTTP API Port of the node.
4. Running the Coordinator: IRI node is already running but it hasn’t received
it’s first milestone yet. For the first time running the coordinator we need to pass
the bootstrap parameter to the command. Coordinator enters an indefinite while
loop and starts sending milestones.
5. Subscribe to events on a node: There may be multiple events that will be
critical for nodes. One of that critical cases is when manager is changing it’s keys
and publishing the new public key to the network. All the nodes from the appro-
priate device group should be notified that there are changes to be able to organize
communication processes accordingly. By setting up the events mechanism on the
node we are making sure that the node will be notified about any events occurring
on the network that he is interested in.
3.3.2 Full Nodes Configuration
After having the tangle network all setup and running, device group gateways need to per-
form their first transactions in the network. First transaction performed by the manager
will be publishing his public key to the tangle.
First transaction performed by the gateway is reading and storing service group man-
ager’s published public key and storing it in the cache in order to be able to do the
verification checks during the future communications. If for some reason the manager
will change or the key pair will be regenerated a new public key will be published by
the manager and all the nodes with already cached public key will be notified about the
changes.
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After having this bootstrapping sequence the system will be fully functional and all
the actions can be performed as described in the scenarios above.
First transaction of all full nodes in the device group except for the manager is read





In this chapter a review of security analysis methodologies is made to enable to choose
one to inspect the proposed solution. After the methodologies review follows the section
that makes an analysis of the proposed architecture by using the most suitable analysis
methodology and resumes the main risks and mitigation that the solution provides. Also,
performed security analysis highlights open challenges that should be addressed in the
future work.
4.1 Security Analysis Methodologies
For many years security was not considered as an important aspect of the software ar-
chitecture. Long years of research has shown that security analysis should be a part
of software development life-cycle (SDLC). For this reason architectural security analy-
sis plays an important role for addressing security threats contained in the architecture.
Goal of the threat analysis is to identify, prioritize and mitigate potential security threats.
Threat analysis of the system is especially important since the cause of many vulnerabili-
ties is proven to be architectural design flows. Fixing those vulnerabilities on early stages
will reduce the waste in the process and decrease the attack vector.
The goal of this overview is to study existing and widely used security analysis method-
ologies in the following aspects:
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• Applicability: what is the level of the abstraction that this methodology can be
applied to? Some methodologies require more in depth knowledge of the system
and will be performed on the later stages of the development life-cycle. This type
of analyses is called code-based. We are aiming for the methodology that will be
applicable to a higher level of abstraction which is system architecture stage of the
development.
• Input: what is the input required for the analyses process? The input refers to
the information that need to be collected about the system in order to perform the
security analysis based on it.
• Procedure: what are the types of procedures performed on the system during the
analysis? Defining this part will show how the input will be processed and what is
the expected result of the process.
• Outcomes: what are the results of the performed analysis? This will show the
added value of the performed analysis.
Based on the research results [22] most commonly used methodologies are misuse cases,
attack trees, problem frames and several software-centric approaches. In general we can
group all approached by risk-centric, attack-centric and software-centric techniques.
1. Misuse cases (MUC): This methodology is a branch of use case and require-
ment based engineering. Misuse cases are used to capture threat flows, alternative
flows, mitigation scenarios, triggers, attacker profiles, etc. Components used by the
methodology are divided into 3 types: abuse cases, MUC maps and MUC scenar-
ios. Difference between abuse and misuse is that abuse is the misuse scenario with
additional malicious intent.
• Attack trees: in this approach the root node is branched into possible attack
vectors. So a single attack path will start from the branch and end at the root
node. This approach is commonly used in a combination with others. First
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part of the analysis is mapping attacks by using attack trees and in the second
part combined approach allows to identify misuse scenarios.
• Problem frames: this approach is used to describe issues in the software. It’s
normally performed on the abstraction level of classes and addresses interfaces
and requirements.
• Goal-oriented requirements engineering (GORE): this is a goal oriented
approach and it is on the abstraction level of systems communicating to each
other in order to achieve goals.
2. Risk-centric threat analysis: This methodology is focusing on the assets and
value for the company. Main goal of this methodology is to find appropriate mitiga-
tion in order to minimize the risk. The main focus is to estimate the financial loss in
case of the possible attack. As a result for this methodology security requirements
will be identified and the ones with highest assets will have the highest priority.
One of the most commonly used methodologies is STRIDE. It can be defined on
various abstraction levels. For that reason it’s considered as one of the most flexible
models to perform threat modeling with. STRIDE is a threat analysis model created
by Microsoft in 1999. Since that time a lot has changed and the methodologies have
evolved with the complexity of the systems [23]. STRIDE can provide a full coverage for
the threat analysis. The threat modeling can be implemented on the component level
or system functionality level. This methodology provides a clear understanding of the
vulnerabilities of the system and possible impacts of each component’s vulnerability on
the entire system. STRIDE stands for security threat analysis in 6 categories: Spoofing,
Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of Service (DOS), Elevation of
Privilege.
As mentioned in table 4.1 STRIDE categories can be described as follows:
Spoofing: Spoofing is a type of attack where the attacker take over component/user
and perform actions on their behalf by falsifying it’s own identity. Example of this type
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Denial of Service(DOS) Availability
Elevation of Privilege Authorization
of attacks can be illegally gaining access over user’s authentication information and using
it for performing various actions in the system. Another example more related to the
industrial environment is attacker extracting cryptographic key from the device by using
vulnerabilities in hardware or software of the device and periodically accessing the system
and performing actions under the identity of the original key owner.
Tampering: Tampering can represent any form of sabotage but mainly it means inten-
tional modification of component/network to make it harmful for the system. Tampering
includes unauthorised changes in the data exchanged in between the components or stored
in one of them. Tampering on the device level can be performed by fully or partially re-
placing software of the device. This action potentially opens up the component for the
spoofing attack described above.
Repudiation: Non-repudiation is a term in security describing inability of the com-
ponent performing the action change the ownership of the action. Good example of this
are signed transactions in the system proving authenticity of the transaction owner. The
repudiation threat is the ability of one of the components to perform an illegal operation
in a system that lacks the ability to trace the prohibited operations.
Information disclosure: Information disclosure is a term describing a scenario when
the component can expose information to unauthorized third parties. For example, if the
component is running with the infected software, the attacker can let himself into the
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component and leak information or inject himself into the communication path between
the components.
Denial of Service(DOS): Denial-of-Service attacks are mainly targeting the goal to
make the service/component temporarily unavailable or deny service to the valid users
of the system. DOS attacks may cause a major damage to the overall system if the
components are codependent. Denial of service is typically accomplished by flooding,
which means sending abnormal amount of requests to the target service in a short period
of time. In the industrial world this attack can also be performed on the physical level.
Elevation of Privilege: In this attack the unprivileged component/user is gaining
a privileged access and is able to perform unauthorized actions in the system. This
attack can be performed by using weak spots of design flow or system configurations.
More complex scenario for performing the attack is penetrating all system defenses and
becoming a trusted part of the system. This can cause a risk of not identifiable attack.
4.2 Security Analysis
It was decided to follow an analysis methodology based on STRIDE. The results are
resumed in the following tables, which examine the attacks, risks and mitigation per type
of the component of the suggested architecture.
The Table 4.2 presents the spoofing attacks considered.
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Table 4.2: Spoofing Threat s






By creating a fake node
similar to the original
one the attacker may
be able to inject fake
information to the sys-
tem, send commands
to different devices and
perform any actions in
scope of the functional-
ity of the original node.
Mitigation to this at-
tack is organized by
having a manual reg-
istration of each de-
vice in the device list
and performing au-
thentication to vali-
date the identity of
the node in the com-
munication flow
Continues on next page
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Table 4.2 – Continued from previous page






Attacks can be per-
formed by using vul-
nerabilities in the light
nodes hardware or soft-
ware and may result in
attacker performing any
actions on behalf of the
node. This spoofing at-
tack can serve as a start-
ing point for other cat-
egory attacks such as
tampering and informa-
tion disclosure
Mitigation of this sce-
nario is having an in-
trusion detection sys-
tem which will be




ing nodes will be re-




decide if it was a
wrong positive alert
or the node must be
revoked from the sys-
tem. According to
the architecture pre-
sented, for the light
nodes that don’t have
capability to generate
their own keys, this
attack may result in a
stolen UUID
Continues on next page
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Table 4.2 – Continued from previous page
Component Attack Risk Mitigation
that belongs to the
device but not the
credentials, as they
are generated and






The main risk of this at-
tack is the attacker pub-
lishing a fake device list
to the tangle by signing
it with the private key
of the original manager.
By faking the identity of
the manager any device
can be injected to the
system and gain access
to perform various ac-
tions.
This attack is hardly
identifiable as no vi-
olation of the rights
was performed. The
mitigation for this at-
tack is to store the
manager key in a se-
cure way by using en-
cryption mechanisms
or secure cloud stor-
age
Continues on next page
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tity of a tangle node
Goal of this attack is to
steal seed of the tangle
network node. This will
result in the attacker
having rights to publish
fake transactions to the
private tangle network
of the system.










of the signature of
the package that
will allow to identify






By masking as a de-
vice gateway the at-
tacker may perform var-
ious actions in the sys-
tem such as taking over
the key generation func-
tionality and publishing
transactions to the net-
work from the not au-
thenticated nodes.
This attack will be
identified on the node
that is reading the
data from the tangle
due to performed val-
idation procedure of
the signature on the
received package
Continues on next page
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Table 4.2 – Continued from previous page
Component Attack Risk Mitigation
Admin panel Gain control over
admin panel on it’s
behalf
By gaining control over
the admin panel the at-
tacker can register, re-
voke or disable devices
from the system. This
actions may cause par-
tial or full failure of the
system as those actions
are serving as an input
for the device list cre-
ation and authentication
processes.
Mitigation for this at-
tack scenario is a
physical protection of
the admin credentials
and isolation of the
admin panel from the
public network
Continues on next page
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Steal the seed As the role of the co-
ordinator in the tangle
network is to capture
the state of the system
by creating a snapshot
which will be used by
the nodes of the tan-
gle for consensus mak-
ing process, by stealing
the seed attacker will be
able to send fake mile-
stones and disrupt pro-
cesses in the tangle net-
work
Mitigation for this at-
tack is storing the
seed in a secure man-
ner such as encrypted
format
The Table 4.3 brings up the tampering attacks taken into consideration.
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Table 4.3: Tampering Threats






data stored on the
node
This attack belongs to
the physical level at-
tacks and can be per-
formed by modifying the
environment that the
sensor is collecting data
from or modifying com-
ponents of the sensor
responsible for the en-
vironment analysis and
data collection
Mitigation of this at-
tack is not possible on
the application level.
It may be detected
and mitigated only by
the physical means
Continues on next page
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Man in the middle
attack
The attacker can modify
packages sent from the
light node to the gate-
way or the packages go-
ing in the opposite flow -
from the gateway to the
light node. The pack-
ages may be modified
in various ways such as
modification of the body
of the package, or source
and destination of it.
As a result the pack-
ages may be delivered to
the nodes that shouldn’t
have access to the infor-
mation, or the nodes will
receive a package with a
fake data and source.
This attack can be
mitigated by having
a trusted data ex-
change channel. This




tion in between the
light nodes and the
gateways
Continues on next page
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By modifying the con-
figurations of the light
nodes the attacker can
make the nodes pro-
duce fake data, send or
perform commands and
can cause unexpected
behaviour of the node in
the physical world.
Access to the config-
urations of the nodes
must be protected by
a secure password if
it can be configured
via web or protected







By modifying the pri-
vate key of the man-
ager the attacker may
cause a denial of service
for the devices registered
after that modification,
because the newly pub-
lished device list will be
signed by a key that
is not recognized in the
system.
Mitigation for this at-
tack is to store the
manager key in a se-
cure way by using en-
cryption mechanisms
or secure cloud stor-
age
Continues on next page
60
Table 4.3 – Continued from previous page






By modifying the stored
device list attacker can
add or remove nodes
from the existing system
which opens up a risk
to injections to the in-
formation disclosure and
denial of service attacks.
Modified device list is
hard to identify, be-
cause it is published
by a trusted node
of the system. As
an addition to the
proposed security so-
lution a verification
process can be imple-
mented to compare
latest version of the
published device list
to the modified one
by taking into ac-
count the requests re-






By modifying the stored
device keys attacker may
cause a conflict in the
authentication process
Keys integrity can be
checked by keeping a
hash of the device key
pair
Continues on next page
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The attacker can mod-
ify packages sent from
the gateway to the tan-
gle or the packages go-
ing in the opposite flow
- from the tangle to the
gateway. The packages
may be modified in vari-
ous ways such as modifi-
cation of the body of the
package, or source and
destination of it. As a
result the packages may
be delivered to the nodes
that shouldn’t have ac-
cess to the information,
or the nodes will receive
a package with a fake
data and source.






we rely on the data
exchange with the
https secure protocol
Admin panel Modify requests to
register/ revoke de-
vices
By this attack it’s possi-
ble to cause denial of ser-
vice for the nodes that
are revoked or inject un-
trusted devices into the
system
Attack can be miti-
gated by having stan-
dard security mecha-
nisms that ensure the
secure data exchange
in the private network
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The Table 4.4 sets forth the repudiation attacks taken into account.
Table 4.4: Repudiation Threats






Attacker can publish the
device list without sign-
ing it or with a faked sig-
nature and attempt to
affect the authentication
mechanism of the sys-
tem
Mitigation of the at-
tack is validation of
the signature proce-
dure. Every time
when any of the com-
ponents will read the
device list from the
tangle network, the
signature will be val-
idated by using the
public key of the
manager placed on
the tangle network.
Continues on next page
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There can be 2 possible
risk vectors for this at-
tack. 1 - Receiver may
not be able to identify
the sender if the signa-
ture is not recognized in
the system. 2 - Receiver
may accept the package
as it has faked signature
of a trusted node in the
system which is not the
original sender.
To mitigate those
risks we perform val-
idation of the sender
by checking the pack-
age signature and





with the fake sig-
nature to the light
nodes
This attack may cause
misbehavior of the light
node. The monitoring
system will not be able
to track the source of the
package that resulted in




node for the light
nodes. As most of




this risk can not be
mitigated.
Continues on next page
64
Table 4.4 – Continued from previous page
Component Attack Risk Mitigation
Admin panel Create and use fake
admin account
Attacker may gain the
same privileges in the
system as the original
admin users
This attack can be
mitigated by using
best practices in se-
curity in the develop-
ment process of the
admin panel and hav-
ing a well defined se-
cure flow for the reg-
istration of the admin
in the system.
The Table 4.5 demonstrates the information disclosure attacks inspected.
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Table 4.5: Information Disclosure Threats










stored on the device to
untrusted third parties.
This may cause loss of
confidential information
about the state of the
system or functionality
of the node which can
be used for the future
attacks
Mitigation of the de-
scribed attack should
be performed on the
physical level which
means making sure
that the device is
not accessible by not
authorized third par-
ties. As a mitigation
the confidential infor-
mation have to be
stored in a encrypted
format. Also stan-
dard security proce-
dures can be imple-
mented such as sim-
ple software scan for
the malware.
Continues on next page
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By performing man in
the middle attack on
the communication net-
work in between light
node and the gateway
attacker will have ac-
cess to all the data ex-
changed for that node.
As a mitigation we
need to provide se-
cure communication
path between those
2 components of the
system as most of
the time they will be
placed on the same
sector of the private
network in the indus-
trial environment. In
the future when light
nodes will gain more
processing power we
will be able to orga-
nize the communica-
tion with secure pro-
tocols
Continues on next page
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By sniffing the commu-
nication path attacker
may steal information
about devices and their
UUID being registered
in the system and on the
other side they may sniff
communication between
device manager and the
gateway and collect pub-
lic keys generated for the
registered devices. By
performing this attack
it’s possible to collect
confidential information
of devices and use them







Continues on next page
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By gaining access to the
stored data such as lat-
est device list the at-
tacker may collect in-
formation about existing
environment and all its’
components and use it
for designing future at-
tack plans
As a mitigation the
confidential informa-
tion have to be stored












keys for newly registered
devices or data packages
exchanged by the light
nodes
Confidential informa-
tion have to be ex-





Continues on next page
69
Table 4.5 – Continued from previous page







If the attacker will gain
access to the stored data
of the gateway he can
extract all the key pairs
generated on the gate-
way for all the devices
existing in the environ-
ment. Those keys can
be used for the future at-
tacks
As a mitigation the
confidential informa-
tion have to be stored
in an encrypted for-
mat.
The Table 4.6 resumes the denial of service attacks evaluated.
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Table 4.6: Denial of Service Threats







physical actions such as
cutting wires, turning
off power, interfering ra-
dio frequencies etc. This
will cause a damage to
the device or it’s con-
nectivity and will result
in a temporary or per-
manent availability is-
sues. Also, flooding at-
tacks and exploiting vul-
nerabilities can stop the
normal operation of de-
vices.
Mitigation of this
attack can be per-
formed by physical
accessibility limita-
tions in the industrial
environment, the
deploy of IDS and
fail-over mechanisms
can help to mitigate
other types of DoS
attacks
Continues on next page
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Causing loss of the
device list
Attacker may attempt
to achieve denial of ser-
vice by removing the de-
vice list from the device
group manager. Loss
of device list may cause
denial of service for all
the devices trying to reg-
ister to the system or
the devices that are re-




the normal operation of
devices.




of the data loss recov-
ery should be added.
When the manager
will detect missing
device list it can be
requested from the
tangle and restored
on the manager. The
deploy of IDS and
fail-over mechanisms
can help to mitigate
other types of DoS
attacks
Continues on next page
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Flooding Attacker may organize
flooding of the network
that will result in the
denial of service, be-
cause services wouldn’t
be able to accept any re-
quests, or may exploit-
ing vulnerabilities that





to drop the traffic or
limit the size of in-
coming ping requests,
also IDS and fail-over
mechanisms can help
to mitigate other





Physical DoS attack Physical attacks on the
full nodes may cause
damage to the servers
hosting those compo-
nents
If those servers are lo-
cated in the industrial
environment, special
access rules have to
be defined to exclude
human intervention.
If the services are
hosted in a cloud,
the service provider
should ensure accessi-
bility of the service
Continues on next page
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Component Attack Risk Mitigation
Admin panel Revoke existing de-
vices, managers and
gateways
This attack affects au-
thentication mechanism
directly, because any re-
voked component will
not pass the authentica-
tion in the system. At-
tacker may cause denial
of service for a group of
devices by just revoking
the device group gate-
way
The attack can be
identified and miti-
gated by intrusion de-
tection systems iden-
tifying anomalies in
the behavior of any of





Remove the seed If the attacker will cause
a loss of the coordi-
nator seed, it will not
be able to generate the
snapshots for the deci-
sion making process of
the other nodes which
will result in the denial
of service and downtime
of the overall infrastruc-
ture
Mitigation of this at-
tack is having the
seed backup stored
securely outside the
node itself for the
seed recovery scenario
The Table 4.7 shows the elevation of privilege attacks considered.
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Table 4.7: Elevation of privilege threats







By gaining access to
the configuration pro-




may result in misbe-
haviour of the node or
can open a backdoor for
future attacks
Configuration panels
of the nodes should
be isolated from the
outer world and be












By targeting the busi-
ness functionality of the
manager the attacker
can perform internal ac-
tions that were not al-
lowed by design. One of
the risks for the manager
can be taking over the
key creation functional-
ity. The device gate-
way will be left out from
the registration process
and will not be notified
about newly registered
devices in the system
To mitigate this risk
roles of the compo-
nents should be de-
fined and access con-
trol should be imple-
mented
Continues on next page
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functionality of the gate-
way attacker can per-
form not authorized ac-
tions such as publish-
ing the device list or re-
moving generated device
keys
To mitigate this risk,
roles of the compo-
nents should be de-
fined and access con-
trol should be imple-
mented
After applying the STRIDE the main risks and mitigation and also open challenges are
presented and discussed. As full nodes of the tangle network have more responsibilities
in the system they have the highest risk for attacks. By attacking the full nodes of the
tangle network an additional vector of risk opens up which can be described as follows:
• Full node generating transactions tips that will prioritize the attackers transactions
over the regular tip selection algorithm.
• Double spending attacks that are making the coordinator to send inconsistent mile-
stones. The nodes will detect the inconsistency in the milestones and will stop the
decision making and transactions confirmation processes.
• The full nodes stopping the milestones transactions distribution process which will
cause a freeze in the transactions confirmation processes.
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4.3 Summary
Due to dependencies between the components of the system, the security of the entire
system can only be ensured by addressing vulnerabilities of each component in the sys-
tem. This chapter demonstrated mapping of STRIDE threats to the components of the
proposed architecture. Based on the STRIDE security analysis methodology applied to
the suggested architectural solution, attack vectors have been reviewed on various layers.
Analysis showed that most of the attacks related to the trust issues in the system al-
ready have a mitigation scenario included in the proposed architecture, because ensuring
trust in the industrial environment was the major goal of the performed work. Attacks
related to the vulnerabilities in the hardware or the software of the devices existing in the
industrial environments don’t have a trivial mitigation scenario, because most of those
devices are not able to receive security updates or critical patches in the runtime. That
issue still persists and should be mitigated by the producers of the devices. Mitigation
of other types of attacks can be achieved by combining various security systems with
the suggested solution. Those combinations have been discussed in the mitigation of the
attack for each vector and should be addressed in future work. Even though some of the
hardware, software or network level attacks are not addressed directly, some of the attacks
will be blocked by confinement mechanisms on the gateway. During the implementation
stage of the suggested architecture threats analysis can serve as an input to the design-






The thesis started with extensive research and analysis of the industrial internet of things
environment and the technological progress in the area. The main target was the security
aspect of the industrial environments, fundamental changes in the automation processes
and challenges caused by that. The results showed that by adopting new generation
of sensors, actuators and other wireless components in the industrial environment, new
back-doors may open up for various attacks that can cause a serious damage to the
environment. Main issues identified in the industrial environments are trust in between
the components of the environment, confidentiality and integrity of the exchanged data,
low processing power of the devices participating in the processes, etc. During the research
a survey about the state of the art in the usage of security protocols for data exchange was
made. The lack of standards in the Industrial Internet of Things environment is causing
additional communication issues. Also, as already mentioned, most of the devices don’t
have the capability to use secure protocols for the data exchange. Most of them are using
lightweight protocols that are not meeting the worldwide security requirements.
Having the trust issues as the main target for the current work we studied existing
solutions in the field and proposed an architecture to ensure secure communication in
between diverse components and layers of the industrial environment. As this topic is
not widely researched and is just starting to arise as a critical industry containing various
security threats, this work can be a good starting point for future researchers on this area.
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In order to combine both security and efficiency in our solution, research was per-
formed to analyze popular solutions in the field. One of the promising branches in the
research is the usage of the blockchain technology to provide trust between the nodes.
Research results showed that classic blockchain is not applicable to the industrial en-
vironments because of it’s time and resource critical characteristics. It was decided to
choose newly developed type of a blockchain called tangle network that is based on a
different mathematical model, works with a different consensus algorithm, but also gives
us the advantage of having asynchronous transactions, that are helping to minimize the
request/response time. To build the trust model in the described industrial environment
we divided the components of the system into 2 logical groups: light nodes and full nodes.
Light nodes are considered to be the ones that don’t have the capability to implement
any security solutions, communicate via secure protocols or participate in the transaction
approval and proof of work processes on the tangle. Full nodes are fully participating
in all processes, both on the tangle and in the industrial environment and also they are
responsible for publishing transactions received from the light nodes to the tangle network
on their behalf. In the proposed solution public/private keys are being generated for each
component of the system and those are serving for the authentication and authorization
purposes. We have analyzed all use case scenarios for all main components of this archi-
tecture. Tangle network is described in high level details, because we are going to use
a developed solution which provides us all components necessary to set up the system.
Bootstrapping of the system is also presented along with the architecture details.
For the proposed architecture there a threat analysis is performed, which allowed us
to see the big picture of the security issues coverage by the proposed solution. It also
showed the open issues in security that can be covered in the implementation or future
work stages.
This architecture is a promising hybrid solution that can be improved in the future
and developed further to the state of a final product that can be adopted by various
industrial environments. The parts of the existing architecture that can be improved due




Next step in the development of the project is implementing the proposed architecture.
The solution should be implemented on top of a test industrial environment with custom
components and network topology. Despite the fact that industrial environments spec-
ifications had been taken into account while building the secure architecture, only after
testing the solution on the test industrial environment close to the real world scenario it
will be possible to perform efficiency analysis of the solution. Efficiency analysis should
be performed for the implemented solution which will take environment specific metrics
as an input and will show as an output the processes that are exceeding the resource
or time thresholds. Optimization of various processes might be required as industrial
environments are highly time and resource critical. One of the risks related to the perfor-
mance can arise due to the growing chain of transactions in the tangle network. Growth
of the transaction chain can increase decision making time for the approval of the trans-
actions by all the nodes participating in the consensus. With the continuous monitoring
of the implemented solution we need to make sure that no perceptible downgrade of the
performance is identified.
Implementation of the architecture should start from the components described in
the bootstrapping part of the architecture. After having those components implemented
we need to start the services and integrate it to the test industrial environment which
will start with the registration of the industrial environment components in the running
system. On this stage of the development process the grouping logic of the devices should
be defined. Devices of the industrial environment can be grouped by the device groups
depending on the architecture of the existing environment. Options for the grouping are
by the network topology, by the device type, by the industrial production line, etc.
As industrial environment is a critical system with interconnected components, the key
components that are the main services of the architecture should have scaling and load
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balancing schemes defined and implemented to ensure the availability of the component.
For that addition to the architecture minor changes might be required in the registration
process of the components. In the currently presented architecture, the registration,
revocation and the disabling processes for the devices should be triggered manually by
the admin. In the future modifications, a partial automation of those processes may be
implemented.
As the main monitoring mechanism of the overall environment an intrusion detection
system can be combined with the existing architecture, as it will serve as a mitigation
for open security issues in the analysed system. As mentioned before during the threat
analysis, many attacks can be detected and reported to the admin. After that, the
admin can continue the analysis of the detected issues and make a final decision and take
countermeasures if needed. To make the process faster and exclude human intervention,
Intrusion Prevention Systems can be deployed in the future to automate decision making
and acting part of the process.
Confidential information is present in industrial environments. To address the chal-
lenges of storing confidential information or components’ secret credentials, a persistent
storage should be used. Also, for some of the critical secrets a backup solution should be
analysed and proposed.
Access control rules described in the architecture can be implemented by using the
event publisher/subscriber mechanism existing in the IOTA current implementation. Cer-
tificate based data exchange is not yet implemented for the IOTA solution, but it’s a work
in progress. After it will be implemented the key management part of the current archi-
tecture can be easily replaced with the certificate based one.
Overall, the IOTA solution is a growing project used in various IoT based environ-
ments. Every day devices and sensors enrolled in the industrial systems are gaining more
processing power and becoming capable of performing more complex calculations. Some
security related functions will start to be made on the light nodes, which will improve the
trust and security. Probably some of the light nodes will gain capabilities to turn into
full nodes and will participate in all processes equally. Our architecture is designed in a
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way to be agnostic to that future use case scenario. That means that the architecture is
flexible enough to easily adjust to the predictable nearest future.
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